BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SACRAMENTO

In the Ma

In the Matter of the License and Licensing Rights of

JOEL THOMAS TOLER,

Respondent.

closed and the matter was submitted for decision on February 8, 2011.

File No. 08C072896-AP OAH No. 2010080143

DECISION and FIRST AMENDED ORDER OF SUSPENSION

This matter came on regularly for hearing before Perry O. Johnson, Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings, in Oakland, California, on January 31, February 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8, 2011. The Complainant was represented by Bruce S. Wiener, Senior Staff Counsel for the Department of Insurance. Respondent, Joel Thomas Toler ("Respondent") was present and represented by John M. Rorabaugh, Attorney at Law, along with David L. Rappaport, Attorney at Law. Oral and documentary evidence was received, and argument was heard. The record was

The Administrative Law Judge submitted his proposed decision dated March 30, 2011, and recommended it be adopted as the decision of the Insurance Commissioner. The Commissioner considered but did not adopt the proposed decision and advised Respondent of his rejection of the proposed decision by notice dated July 7, 2011. The Department received the transcript of the hearing on September 6, 2011. Pursuant to §11517(c)(2)(E)(iv) of the Government Code, the Department is required to issue its final decision within 100 days of receiving the transcript, in this case no later than December 15, 2011. A final decision was served on Respondent on December 14, 2011. Respondent, by letter dated January 6, 2012, requested a reconsideration of the final decision. The Commissioner granted a stay of the order of suspension until February 10, 2012. That stay was

extended until February 17, 2012, by an order dated February 9, 2012. The Commissioner has now fully considered both Respondent's and the Department's submissions relating to the reconsideration request.

NOW, THEREFORE, having considered the record, including the evidence introduced, the transcript of the proceedings in this matter, the Insurance Commissioner hereby makes the following: Findings of Fact, Legal Conclusions, and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. Respondent is currently licensed by the Department of Insurance and is conducting business under the fictitious business name of Toler Bail Bonds from a principal office in the City of Fairfield, Solano County, State of California. Respondent has been licensed as a bail agent since December 8, 2003. Respondent was previously licensed by the Insurance Commissioner to act as a Fire and Casualty Broker-Agent from January 16, 2004 to January 31, 2006. On April 20, 2010, Accusation No. 08C072896-AP was signed on behalf of the Department. The accusation sought revocation of Respondent's bail agent license by reason of four distinct incidents. Out of those four incidents, the trier of fact, Administrative Law Judge Perry O. Johnson, found that the testimony of the Department's witnesses lacked in credibility and consequently the allegations in two of the incidents were not sustained. Despite the credibility findings, the two remaining allegations relating to the Gilmore/Baldwin matter and the Gordon/Gordon-Compton matter were supported by competent evidence above and beyond that provided by the Department's witnesses and remain a serious concern to the Commissioner.
- 2. In early April of 2008, Respondent was contacted by telephone from jail by Adam Baldwin and arranged bail bonds for the release of Adam Baldwin and his wife, Akela Gilmore, who was in custody on a separate case. The bail bond issued for Adam Baldwin was exonerated on May 6, 2008, when he was sentenced. The bail bond for Akela Gilmore was exonerated on May 19, 2008, when Akela Gilmore was released on her own recognizance. Neither Adam Baldwin nor Akela Gilmore were out on bail or had any bail bond in effect on May 29, 2008.
- 3. On May 29, 2008, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Respondent went to the apartment in Vacaville where Adam Baldwin resided and knocked on the door. When Akela Gilmore answered

- 4. In 2008, Respondent issued a bail bond to secure the release of Jeffrey Moore. A man named Thomas Hughes acted as a co-signer on Moore's bail bond. Thomas Hughes received some mail at the house of Terry Compton-Gordon and Donald Gordon, parents of his childhood friend, but had never resided there. Moore subsequently became a bail fugitive. In October 2008, Respondent sent a process server to serve a summons on Hughes at the house of Terry Compton-Gordon and Donald Gordon. While there the process server was told Hughes did not reside at that address. The next day the process server received a call at the office of Toler Bail Bonds from Donald Gordon who reiterated that Hughes did not reside at his property.
- 5. In January 2009, Respondent went to the house of Terry Compton-Gordon and Donald Gordon in a search for Jeffrey Moore or Thomas Hughes. Before he arrived at the house, Respondent made a telephone call to either the local police department or sheriff's office to inform the law enforcement agency that the bail agent might effect the apprehension of a fugitive named

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Thomas Moore. Respondent was met at the door by Terry Compton-Gordon. When he explained he was looking for Moore or Hughes, Compton-Gordon explained that neither man lived at that residence. Donald Gordon then came to the door, told Respondent that he had been told before that neither Moore nor Hughes lived at the Gordon house, and asked respondent to leave the property. A verbal confrontation ensued. After the incident between the Gordons and Respondent, law enforcement personnel arrived at the scene based on a 911 telephone call by Terry Compton-Gordon. Respondent did not have any paperwork in his possession regarding the status of Jeffrey Moore, his bail bond status, his cosigner Thomas Hughes, or proper documentation of authority to apprehend Jeffrey Moore.

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

- 1. This matter pertains to the discipline of a professional license by the Insurance Commissioner. Procedural due process requires a regulatory board or agency to prove the allegations of an accusation filed against a licensee by clear and convincing evidence rather than merely by a preponderance of the evidence. "Clear and convincing" evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.²
 - 2. Insurance Code section 1805 provides in pertinent part:
 - "The commissioner may decline to issue a bail license until he is satisfied that:
 - (c) The applicant has an understanding of the obligations and duties of bail;
 - (d) The applicant has not participated in or been connected with any business transaction which, in the opinion of the commissioner tends to show unfitness to act in a fiduciary capacity or to maintain the standards of fairness and honesty required of a trustee or other fiduciary;

-4-

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¹ Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 763, 789.

 $^{^{2}}$ In re David C. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1208.

-5-

⁶ Ready v. Grady (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d. 113, 117.

⁷ Insurance Code section 1737 made applicable by section 1821.

⁸ Goldberg v. Barger (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 987. 834.

- 6. There must be a logical connection between a licensee's conviction or other misconduct and the fitness or competence to practice the profession or to the qualifications, functions or duties of the profession.⁹
- 7. Cause exists to suspend or revoke Respondent's licenses and licensing rights, pursuant to Insurance Code sections 1805, subdivision (c), and 1807, on grounds that Respondent does not have an understanding of the obligations and duties of bail, as set forth in Findings 1 through 5, in conjunction with Legal Conclusions 1 through 9. Respondent provided testimony at hearing on a wide range of issues pertaining to the bail bond industry and his agency's particular practices. According to the Administrative Law Judge, "He demonstrated that he has a wealth of experience and knowledge as a bail bond agent." Nevertheless, Respondent's failure to verify the bond status of both Akela Gilmore and Adam Baldwin, his unauthorized entry into the Gilmore household, and his failure have the to proper documentation of authority to apprehend issued by the bail or depositor of bail in both the Gilmore and Compton-Gordon incidents are indicative of a lack of understanding of the obligations and duties of a bail agent. The insurance business requires persons to exercise reasonable diligence in the conduct of their affairs. Respondent's conduct does not demonstrate such reasonable diligence.
- 8. Cause exists to suspend or revoke Respondent's license to act as a Bail Agent under Insurance Code section 1805, subdivision (h), and 1807, on grounds that Respondent is not a fit and proper person to hold his license, as set forth in Findings 1 through 5, in conjunction with Legal Conclusions 1 through 9. Despite Respondent's more than 7 years as a licensed bail agent and "wealth of experience and knowledge as a bail bond agent", Respondent failed to verify the bond status of Akela Gilmore and Adam Baldwin before going to the Gilmore residence, had never met either Baldwin or Gilmore and had no photograph or other document to assist in identifying either of them, forced his way into the residence without possession of a warrant or other documentary authorization, failed to leave the premises as requested by the apartment's legal tenant, and engaged in a physical confrontation which resulted in Akela Gilmore's father been hit in the chest with a taser dart fired by the Respondent. At the very least, he has failed to demonstrate

⁹ Griffiths v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 757, 769

9. Considering the record as a whole, Respondent's acts and omissions surrounding the incidents set forth in the Statement of Facts were not a credit to the bail bond profession. The evidence indicates that respondent and the associate agents in the bail agency made mistakes and that Respondent's conduct exhibited frustration, anger, rudeness, and impulsive zealousness. Even though both Akela Gilmore and Adam Baldwin's bail had been previously exonerated, Respondent went to the Gilmore residence at night without verifying their bond status, forced his way into the residence without a warrant or other documentary authorization, and got himself involved in a melee which concluded with him shooting a resident with a taser dart. Respondent went to the Compton-Gordon residence in anticipation of apprehending a bail fugitive by the name of Jefferey Moore, despite being told numerous times that neither Moore or his cosigner resided there, failed to leave the premises as requested by the property owner, and got himself involved in a verbal confrontation with Donald Gordon which resulted in the authorities being called. The insurance business requires licensees to exercise reasonable diligence in the conduct of their affairs. Respondent's conduct does not demonstrate such reasonable diligence. The Commissioner has reason to be concerned. Considering the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation, a suspension is a sufficient means to insure that Respondent does not exercise the privileges granted under his bail license in derogation of the public interest and impress upon him the professional standards of conduct and legal obligations surrounding the transacting of bail.

ORDER

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's license and licensing rights to act as a Bail Agent are hereby SUSPENDED, subject to the following terms and conditions:

a. Respondent's licenses and licensing rights shall be suspended for a period

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of thirty (30) calendar days, with said suspension beginning on Friday, March 16, 2012, at 8:00 a.m., and ending on Friday, April 13, 2012, at 5:00 p.m. During the suspension period, Respondent shall not transact the business of insurance. "Transact" as applied to insurance includes, but is not limited to, any of the following: (a) Solicitation. (b) Negotiations preliminary to execution. (c) Execution of a contract of insurance. (d) Transaction of matters subsequent to execution of the contract and arising out of it. (California Insurance Code Section 35.)

This Order shall be effective thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed by official seal, this 17th day of February, 2012.

DAVE JONES
Insurance Commissioner

By: /s/

PATRICIA STAGGS Deputy Commissioner